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Introduction
While the evolution and governance of Islamic banking and finance (IBF) in Malaysia has received considerable empirical attention, Singapore has remained outside the focus of most research on IBF, and in both cases, the development and governance of IBF has received little theoretical or conceptual treatment. In addressing this lacuna in the literature, we offer a comparison of IBF in a Muslim-majority country (Malaysia) and Muslim-minority country (Singapore) since the 1980s to analyze the ways in which the practice of IBF has unfolded across these two different state spaces, and discuss their significance for a 2 conceptual understanding of the development and governance of IBF. While both states have legitimized the pursuit of IBF as part of an agenda to secure and build upon Kuala Lumpur and Singapore's aspirations as international financial centers (IFCs), the development and governance of IBF in these two national states have taken different turns through different mechanisms and forms of institutional governance.
To be more specific, we contend that both the Malaysian and Singaporean states exhibit features of 'neoliberal-developmentalism' (Liow 2012; Elias and Rethel, 2016) .
However, for Malaysia, we argue that this involved a 'semi-developmentalism' during the 1980s that gradually evolved into an Islamic and internationally-oriented 'ordoliberalism'
rather than a strictly market-driven approach over the last 15 years. For Singapore, while certainly not discounting broader developmental efforts, we maintain that the government has pursued a more market-driven approach for IBF but which also increasingly involves elements of ordo-liberalism. With such broad political economic distinctions in mind, we then focus on particular rationales and practices to distinguish between the governance of IBF in the two countries, based on the presence of ethnic politics, the moral suasion employed by domestic agencies in promoting Islamic financial product innovation (such as sukuk); the extent of the demand for Sharia-compliant banking and financial products, the centrality of Sharia governance, the substantive fiscal support provided by the Malaysian government as compared to the more passive 'tax neutrality' approach of the Singaporean state; and the more comprehensive and activist approach taken in Malaysia to construct a fully-fledged IBF 'ecosystem' in contrast to a more selective and market-based approach in Singapore.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly outline the main contours of IBF and argue for a critical conceptual approach to analyzing how the international financial architecture and national political economies might intersect in the development of new financial markets-in this case, that of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore.
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We then sketch out the currently limited conceptual literature on IBF in Malaysia and Singapore in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we present empirical analyses of the development and governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore to illustrate our conceptual arguments. In the conclusion, we reiterate our main findings and reflect upon our contribution to the existing critical social scientific literature on the governance of IBF, as well as considering some avenues for further research.
Conceptualizing IBF in a post-neoliberal world?
IBF is a form of banking and finance which is rooted in Sharia law, and is considered by many of its practitioners to be a more 'socially just' system of finance than 'conventional finance'. IBF entails a number of prohibitions. Among the most pivotal is the injunction against riba (interest). Other, perhaps equally important prohibitions include Gharar (excessive risk, uncertainty), maysir (gambling) and 'making money from money' (currency speculation or many financial derivatives would be examples). In addition, Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) should not invest in businesses that trade in products, services, or forms of entertainment deemed haram. In light of the prohibition on 'making money from money', financial transactions should in principle be asset-based, such as around real estate or commodities. IBF products and services extend across the spectrum from deposit accounts to project-financing to takaful (insurance). While transactions that are rooted in 'equityfinancing' or 'profit-sharing' (referred to as musharaka and mudarabah) are often seen as ideal by Sharia scholars and many Islamic bankers and financiers, a dominant form of contract continues to be murabaha or cost-plus financing, which, like other financial instruments such as sukuk (Islamic bonds), have produced debate among many observers With respect to the relationship between the IFA and IBF, a handful of critical/nonneo-classical conceptual studies have explored the relationship between the governance of conventional finance and the governance of IBF (Fang 2014; Karim, 2010; Mohamad and Saravanamuttu, 2015; Samers, 2007, 2013; Pitluck 2013; Rethel 2010a ). While Pitluck (2013) argues that IBF is governed through a 'mimesis' of the IFA, Rethel (2010a) offers a more nuanced argument of the ways in which '…while Islamic finance challenges
Western, more specifically Anglo-American dominance of the international financial system, at the same time it serves to reproduce, to legitimise and thus to further entrench the knowledge structures that underpin contemporary finance ' (2010a: 76) . This means that in terms of establishing and strengthening the legitimacy of IBF, the specific products as well as their governance structures must necessarily appeal to the traditional Muslim constituency as well as the realm of global finance within which IBF seeks to become established. Fang (2014) , in turn, argues against Susan Strange's 'structural power' of 'conventional financial practices' and instead suggests that the actors associated with IBF do not necessarily need to acquiesce to the 'structural power' of the supposed IFA and its neoliberalising processes.
Following on from the arguments above, we draw upon the idea of 'small n' neoliberalism (Ong 2006; Collier 2012) in conceptualizing the development and governance of IBF. This approach does not begin with neoliberalisation but imagine it as only one dimension of political economy. In this vein, the development and governance of IBF should not be viewed just as an alternative to conventional banking and finance; instead we hold to the view that 6 IBF participates in the emergence of a multipolar financial landscape by shifting the flow and concentration of capital from Euro-American financial hubs to other regions (e.g. Pollard and Samers, 2007) , as well as the ways in which the IFA and national political economies might intersect in the development of new financial markets.
On national political economies
With or without reference to IBF, the national political economies of Malaysia and
Singapore have been characterized as developmentalist or developmental (e.g. Funston, 2001; Lai, 2015) , as authoritarian strong states (Slater 2012) ; and, in the case of Singapore, as a hybrid 'neoliberal-developmental' state (Liow 2012) . Malaysia has been analyzed as 'semidevelopmentalist' (Henderson, 1999; Rhodes and Higgott, 2000) , as shaped by 'acquisitive corruption' and as a 'weak' state (Henderson, 1999) ; as 'neoliberal developmental' (Elias and Rethel, 2016) , as 'post-developmental' with neoliberal strategies in which specific zones (or regions) and populations within countries are turned outwards towards an engagement with the neoliberal global financial order (Ong 2006) ; as formerly 'crony capitalist' changing to neoliberal after 2000 (Rethel 2010b) , and as a 'competitive authoritarian' regime (Pepinsky 2009 ). The effect of cultural and religious practices on state power and governance, particularly in Malaysia have also been noted in terms of how states address Islamist challenges (Henderson, 1999; Nasr, 2001 Developmentalism as a concept is often poorly defined in the literature, and its continued relevance has been debated. 1 For the purpose of this paper, we take it to mean not just strong state intervention geared towards economic growth, as Liow seems to generically define it, but that a 'state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to promote and sustain development' (Castells 1992 : 56-7, cited in Stubbs 2009 . In this sense, we view the Malaysian state as 'semi-developmentalist' insofar as i) it retains many elements of developmentalism (see e.g. Lai, 2015) in its direction of certain economic 'projects' -among them the growth of IBF, but ii) it has been shaped by, and also legitimated through, 'ethnic politics'. We elaborate on this in the subsequent discussion.
In Malaysia, the rise and governance of IBF specifically has received considerable empirical attention concerning its emergence in the 1980s and its rapid growth in the 1990s and 2000s (e.g. Ariff and Rosly, 2011; Hadiz and Khoo 2011; Haneef 2001; Karim 2010; Lai, 2015; Liow 2009; Mohamad and Saravanamuttu, 2015; Naguib and Smucker, 2010; Nasr 2001; Rudnyckyj, 2014; Tripp, 2006; Venardos 2012; Wilson 1998 In contrast to Malaysia, there has been a distinctive paucity of both theoretical and empirical research on IBF in Singapore. Scholarly and more policy-oriented research on IBF predominantly relates to legal frameworks and governance issues arising from implementing Sharia laws on financial products and implications for compliance and risk management (Chia and Wang 2008; White 2009 ). Other studies are broad surveys of IBF markets and services in Singapore with limited engagement with critical social science theories or political economic analysis (Gerrard and Cunningham 1997; Venardos 2012) . Since the early 2000s, the Singapore government has embarked on a distinctive push towards developing the city-state as a premier IFC and regional financial services hub, particularly in terms of developing deeper and more diverse capital markets and widening range of financial products and services (Lai 2013; Lai and Tan 2015) . IBF in Singapore therefore sits within this context of a wider strategy for IFC growth. Given the limited critical conceptual interventions on the governance of IBF in both countries, and the lack of research on IBF in Singapore specifically, we identify two challenges: conceptualizing any commonalities or differences in state processes across national political economies, and the need to understand the intersection of market disciplinary rule regimes and the development and governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore. In this paper then, we draw on the three closely related concepts discussed above namely: Liow's notion of the neoliberal developmental state, 'semidevelopmentalism' and an Islamically-inflected neoliberalism (or even 'ordoliberalism), in order to frame our empirical analysis.
MALAYSIA

From Islamisation to the development of IBF: semi-developmentalism in practice
The However, this Islamic revival concerned not simply the application of Sharia, but rather the benefit and enrichment of Muslims. Such a move would stave off protest from PAS, which broadly-speaking held capitalist development to be un-Islamic, while also reassuring Chinese entrepreneurs and investors that Malaysian Islamism would not threaten their investments.
His political project therefore had ethical but also practical purposes (Hadiz and Khoo 2011; Haneef 2001; Liow 2009; Nasr 2001; Tripp 2006 (2001) and Hadiz and Khoo (2011) argue that the ruling UMNO had to ensure its control over Barely two years later, the UNMO passed a far-reaching Islamisation program that included the 1983 Islamic Banking Act, which did not Islamise the entire banking system but provided
Muslims with an Islamic banking option. Boosted by income from oil and gas production (Mohamad and Sarvanamuttu, 2015) , the government also established the first Islamic bank 12 (Rudnyckyj, 2014; Warde 2010 ). Both of these enterprises grew rapidly during the 1980s in the context of general market liberalisation, which entailed relaxing regulations on share issues, reducing corporate taxes, and lowering capital reserve requirements for banks in order to encourage equity purchasing and capital market expansion. These developments in IBF and the liberalisation of financial markets worked to UMNO's advantage since such policies sought to increase the wealth of the Bumiputera. Nonetheless, IBF figured only marginally within Malaysian banking and finance at this point (Haneef 2001; Nasr 2001; Rethel 2010b ). 
The governance of rapid IBF growth in
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To reinforce this trajectory, BNM accelerated the growth of IBF by introducing a scheme in 1993 allowing conventional financial institutions to operate with two divisionsone charging interest, and the other Sharia-compliant (their so-called 'Islamic window'). In doing so, the establishment of these windows undermined the monopoly of BIMB (Lai, 2015) , and the government viewed this 'dual system' as the most effective and rapid means of increasing the number of institutions offering IBF services at the lowest cost. Again, the move also signalled that the government 'maintained a prudent and evolutionary approach'
(ibid, 184), to the growth of IBF by referring to the 'Interest-Free Banking Scheme' rather than by constructing a fully coherent and generalized Islamic banking and financial system, which would also risk protest from non-Malay minorities (Haneef 2001; Haq 2010; Karim 2010; Lai, 2015) . Alongside the development of Islamic windows, the government took a somewhat more active move by creating Khazanah in 1993 (a sovereign wealth fund) that begun to issue sukuk, and whose issuances remain crucial to innovation in IBF in the 21 st century (Lai, 2015) . Furthermore, in 1994, the government created Islamic mutual funds, the Banking Scheme', signaling the intent of policy-makers to focus increasingly on developing and legitimizing IBF (Karim 2010; Lai, 2015) . Islamic windows. In practice however, the subsidiary 'fell back on their "parents" to settle overnight debts rather than rely on the Islamic money market' (Rudnyckyj, 2014, 79 Two new Islamic insurance (takaful) schemes followed in 1995, both supported by government organisations such as Keppel Bank (a government-owned bank), and NTUC Income (a large insurance co-operative with close government ties). These takaful products were billed as test cases before further steps were taken to introduce other IBF products (AMPRO Holdings 1995). After these initial forays, IBF activities in Singapore remained rather obscure through the rest of the 1990s with no particularly significant development.
Semi-developmentalism and
Although the government took the initial step in bringing IBF to market, it then took a back seat to observe how the IBF market might develop organically. During this period, the interest in IBF products proved rather limited amongst both Muslim and non-Muslim financial consumers (Gerrard and Cunningham 1997) Singapore has a much smaller domestic market for IBF, unlike neighbouring Malaysia and Indonesia, the focus has been on building off the infrastructure currently in place, to offer wholesale market activities in the areas of capital markets activities and wealth management, and persuading financial institutions to add on IBF products and services to the existing suite of activities. As explained by the then deputy director of the Monetary Authority of
Singapore (MAS):
We have previously preferred to let the market find its own pace and niche. Increasingly though, we recognise that if Singapore, as a major financial centre, were to be a part in the global growth of Islamic finance, MAS has to be involved in the market's future development, and sooner rather than later (Ong 2005) .
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As the IBF sector took on greater strategic importance for Singapore's role as an international financial centre and regional hub, the government adopted a more proactive stance towards stimulating IBF activities. Rather than direct intervention in the IBF sector, the MAS adopted a more market-oriented approach in shaping the scope of IBF development through regulatory reviews, greater participation in international Islamic governing bodies and, later on, tax revisions for IBF products. Instead of establishing a separate regulatory framework for IBF, MAS applied a common framework as it considered an Islamic bank to encounter the same types of risks (e.g. credit risk, liquidity risk and operational risks) and similar prudential and supervisory issues as a conventional bank (Vernados, 2012). 
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While there has been significant development in IBF in Singapore particularly over the past decade, the Singapore market still has relatively few IFIs as compared to Malaysia. It also suffers from the lack of a domestic market with no Islamic pension funds and little business demands for Sharia compliant financial vehicles (Maierbrugger 2014) . In this sense, Singapore's struggles with developing the IBF sector could be because its domestic rule regimes are not Islamically-inflected enough in order to create a critical mass of IBF expertise, institutions, products and investors. While the MAS has clearly demonstrated a commitment to IBF as a key sector for Singapore IFC development (Venardos 2012) , the Singaporean government is banking on a wider neoliberal strategy that has driven its IFC development thus far. In this case, IBF fits into this overall strategy as part of creating more diverse financial sectors and deeper capital markets within a regulatory climate that welcomes financial innovation and new financial institutions (Lai and Tan, 2015) . The enmeshing of global financial networks, national economic development strategies and
Islamically-inflected modes of market making have unfolded in quite distinctive ways in a non-Islamic jurisdiction amidst wider political economic trends of increasing Middle Eastern and Asian trade and investment linkages (Siow, 2015) .
CONCLUSIONS
In response to the limited engagement with critical conceptual thought on the governance of IBF, this paper aimed to compare and conceptualize the development and governance of IBF in Malaysia and Singapore since the 1980s. In particular, we focused on the ways in which this has unfolded in variegated ways, including the significance of ethnic politics, the often contentious moral suasion involved in establishing IBF products and services, the character and timing of innovation, the centralization of Sharia compliance, the 26 nature of tax incentives, and the strength of regulatory and financial support. Some of these differences are summarized in Table 1 .
*** Table 1 around here ***
The debate on the development and governance of IBF in Malaysia specifically (but which also has implications for Singapore) rests on either more 'developmentalist-oriented' arguments such as Lai's (2015) 'industrial policy' oriented towards finance, or on the other hand, Mohamad and Saravanamuttu's (2015) 'neoliberal exceptions ' and Rudnyckyj's (2014) 'afterlives of development'. With this debate in mind, and as we worked on conceptualizing commonalities and differences in the evolution of IBF, we relied on what Liow (2012) broadly calls a 'neoliberal-developmentalist state'. However, we nuanced this by arguing that for Malaysia, this involved a transition from a 'semi-developmentalism' in the 1980s and 1990s (that is a set of governance practices partly shaped by, and legitimated through an In terms of future research on the development and governance of IBF in southeast Asia, we would highlight the value of exploring the intersection of first, an emergent 'Islamic international financial architecture' (IIFA) (Iqbal 2007; Rethel 2010a) , that includes, but is not limited to organizations such as AAOIFI and IFSB; second, the apparently increasing weight of an Asian regional financial architecture as witnessed for example in the partnerships between the Asian Development Bank, IFIs, and Islamic regulatory institutions, and third, the IFA as discussed at the beginning of this paper. This would move the discussion away from simply 'methodologically nationalist' treatments of the growth and governance of IBF to the articulation of national political economies and different forms of supra-national governance in an ostensibly post-neoliberal world.
